As you may know, the Eclipse Foundation is about to fund a security audit of the recent changes to p2 to support detached signatures (made to replace classical jars signing).
The Eclipse Foundation recognizes the benefits of the new workflow and we would like to help the project verify that the move from a chain of trust based on certificates managed by the JRE to a chain of trust based on PGP did not introduce any flaw in the verification process. Such a flaw could render users' setup vulnerable to attacks and exploitation of a flaw could be a hard blow to the Eclipse IDE reputation.
I will shortly introduce an audit company to the Eclipse p2 committers. I will do that on the equinox-dev mailing list. I will ask the committers to help us (the Eclipse Foundation and the audit company) define the exact scope of the audit. We kindly ask you, members of the Eclipse PMC, your support with this process. We will especially appreciate your help with easing the communication between the project and the audit company and as such, make the audit to be as fruitful as possible.