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Re: [open-regulatory-compliance] FYI UK Government report on OSS trust - gaps

Florian,

 

All of the US Government materials I refer to are available openly to the public:

https://cisa.gov/sag

https://www.nasa.gov/secure-software-development-self-attestation-resources-and-knowledge/

 

I’ve also posted my March 21, 2025 presentation to NASA/DOE online, which covers the government materials I refer to above:

https://github.com/rjb4standards/Presentations/raw/refs/heads/master/20250321-SAG-CTR.pptx

 

Information regarding the IETF SCITT trust registry concept is also available to the public:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scitt-architecture/

 

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

  

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector,

Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership

 

Never trust software, always verify and report!

Risk always exists, but trust must be earned and awarded.

https://businesscyberguardian.com/

Email: dick@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

 

From: Idelberger, Florian (IIWR) <florian.idelberger@xxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2025 1:31 PM
To: dick@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Open Regulatory Compliance Working Group <open-regulatory-compliance@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [open-regulatory-compliance] FYI UK Government report on OSS trust - gaps

 

Well you wrote of certain US gov’t initiatives for their own usage. I assume none of that is open or accessible based on what you wrote, whether for reading or writing.

 

-- 
Dr. Florian Idelberger


Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Zentrum für Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (ZAR)
Institut für Informations- und Wirtschaftsrecht
Vincenz-Prießnitz-Str. 3, D-76131 Karlsruhe

E-Mail: florian.idelberger@xxxxxxx

KIT - Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und
nationales Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft



Am 12.03.2025 um 15:20 schrieb Dick Brooks <dick@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>:

 

Free and open access to a Trust Registry for the public to query a “cybersecurity label”  is a critical success factor to ensure that people are buying and using trustworthy products.

 

Write access to the “Trust Registry” is closely guarded and monitored in order to ensure high integrity and maximum trust by the public.

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

<image007.png>  <image008.png> <image009.png>

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 

Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership

 

Risk always exists, but trust must be earned and awarded.™

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

 

From: Idelberger, Florian (IIWR) <florian.idelberger@xxxxxxx> 
Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2025 10:16 AM
To: dick@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Open Regulatory Compliance Working Group <open-regulatory-compliance@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [open-regulatory-compliance] FYI UK Government report on OSS trust - gaps

 

We have recently submitted a proposal for a research project would develop sth like this. Which would be open and accessible, if funded and deployed.

 

-- 
Dr. Florian Idelberger


Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Zentrum für Angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (ZAR)
Institut für Informations- und Wirtschaftsrecht
Vincenz-Prießnitz-Str. 3, D-76131 Karlsruhe

E-Mail: florian.idelberger@xxxxxxx

KIT - Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und
nationales Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft




Am 12.03.2025 um 15:06 schrieb Dick Brooks via open-regulatory-compliance <open-regulatory-compliance@xxxxxxxxxxx>:

 

FYI:

 

A UK Government report on open source software contains some very specific findings and recommendation to establish trustworthiness in open source software:

 

4.1.3 Trust in Open-Source Software

Trust in OSS is a critical concept when adopting OSS components. How does one

come to trust an OSS component? More often than not, “there is no sound basis

for trust in the Software Ecosystems (SECO) hubs”, with trust being considered

“founded or unfounded” (Hou et al., 2022).

 

Outside of academic papers, trustworthiness wasn’t mentioned in any of the best

practices we reviewed.

 

This is a significant gap in the best practices landscape, as trust plays a vital role

in adopting OSS components.

 

This is precisely why a SCITT Trust Registry is essential, to serve as a trust anchor for trustworthy software products with specific cybersecurity labels providing justification for a “trust score” in the registry, which the buying public can query before buying a product.

 

The US Coast Guard is planning to implement a “Trust Registry” of approved products, which limits which products can be installed in IT and OT systems used by the US Coast Guard:

 

I’m doing a presentation to the US NASA and the US Department of Energy (DOE) on March 21 on this very topic of SCITT Trust Registries to identify trustworthy products that have passed a risk assessment and may be installed in IT and OT systems.

Trustworthiness of a product will be based on NIST SCRM best practices contained in CISA’s Secure Software Acquisition Guide, https://cisa.gov/sag

 

Am happy to share my March 21 slides with any that request them.

 

 

 

Thanks,

 

Dick Brooks

<image007.png>  <image008.png> <image009.png>

Active Member of the CISA Critical Manufacturing Sector, 

Sector Coordinating Council – A Public-Private Partnership

 

Risk always exists, but trust must be earned and awarded.™

Tel: +1 978-696-1788

 

 

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